Consenting to Counter-normative Sexual Acts: Differential Effects of Consent on Anger and Disgust as a Function of Transgressor or Consenter
In criminal law, an important factor influencing the liability of a sexual offense is consent (Baker, 2009; Christopher & Pinals, 2010; Feldman-Summers & Palmer, 1980; Scroggs, 1976) . Within the context of criminal law, blame and punishment are often mitigated if it is proven that both parties consented to the act (Feinberg, 1984 (Feinberg, , 1988 Hart, 1968; Robinson, 1984) . By contrast, the absence of consent is essentially what makes an otherwise innocent, private act transgressive and punishable (Baker, 2009) , though prior to 2003 in the U.S. even some private, consensual sexual acts were deemed punishable by rule of law in some states. The use of consent as a criminal defense is not without limitation (Baker, 2009; McConnell, 2000) and determining whether consent is present is often a complex matter (Bolt & Caswell, 1981; Christopher & Pinals, 2010; Jenkins & Dambrot, 1987; Muehlenhard, 1988; Sullivan, 2007; Whatley, 1996) .
Despite a vast literature on perceptions of consent and blame within sexual offenses (see Whatley, 1996 , for a review), no research has systematically investigated the effect of consent on eliciting morally condemning emotions in the context of sexual offences. In the present research, we compared the influence of consent on anger and disgust, both of which have been linked to judgments of wrongdoing and condemnation (e.g., Haidt, 2003; Horberg, Oveis, Keltner, & Cohen, 2009; Inbar, Pizarro, Knobe, & Bloom, 2009; Prinz, 2007; Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999; Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2011a , 2011b , 2011c , 2013 Russell, Piazza, & Giner-Sorolla, 2013) . Most perspectives consider disgust the primary emotion relevant to the sexual domain (see e.g., Haidt, 2003; Horberg et al., 2009; Prinz, 2007; Rozin et al., 1999) and the general trend has been to focus on reactions to the action or transgressor (e.g., Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008; Wheatley & Haidt, 2005) . By contrast, little attention has been given to responses to both individuals involved within a sexual offense. In an attempt to fill this gap, we examine the impact of consent on both anger and disgust in the context of sexual offenses that have a clear victim and perpetrator, as well as victimless offenses that involve mutual consent or the wilful fulfilment of a sexual request.
We hypothesized that that anger would be relevant to judgments of sexual offenses when the act is perceived as being unjust. A great deal of evidence suggests that moral anger is closely tied to perceptions of harm and injustice, such as someone selfishly engaging in an unfair distribution of resources, recklessly injuring someone, or unjustifiably insulting another person (Goldberg, Lerner, & Tetlock, 1999; Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996; Rozin et al., 1999) . We submit that injustice (i.e., the selfish violation of a person's interests) is the central appraisal of anger. As such, anger should be highly focused on transgressors (i.e., individuals that are primarily responsible for an act of injustice); furthermore, anger should be elicited by injustice witnessed across action domains, whether sexual or violent in nature. Conversely, anger should be less focused on victims, or individuals who have been wronged, who generally evoke sympathy from third parties (see Goetz, Keltner, & Simon-Thomas, 2010) , and when there is mutual consent between individuals, the event should be less aggravating to third parties, since no injustice has occurred. This would be consistent with other research showing that anger is a flexible emotion, sensitive to the actors' reasons for acting and the circumstances surrounding an act of wrongdoing (Piazza, Russell, & Sousa, 2013; Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2011a , 2011b , 2011c .
In contrast with anger, disgust directed at a transgressor seems to be more stable regardless of the transgressor's reasons or justifications for acting (see Piazza et al., 2013; Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2011a , 2011b , 2011c Young & Saxe, 2011) . For example, unlike anger, disgust appears insensitive to whether a counter-normative sexual act is performed with or without awareness (Young & Saxe, 2011) or in the pursuit of a greater good ). Disgust appears to be a more categorical, object-focused emotion than anger (Ortony, Clore & Collins, 1988; . Indeed, disgust's elicitation within the social-moral domain 1 appears to be focused on the occurrence of "bodily-norm violations" (see Giner-Sorolla, Bosson, Caswell, & Hettinger, 2012; , which mainly includes counter-normative sexual practices (e.g., incest and other suboptimal sexual unions), but also food taboos involving people (e.g., cannibalism). On the other hand, some research suggests that certain aspects of disgust (e.g., facial markers) may even be elicited by non-bodily moral transgressions (e.g., acts of unfairness), in addition to bodily-norm violations-in other words, that disgust's role in morality extends beyond misuses of the body (e.g., Chapman & Anderson, 2014; Chapman, Kim, Susskind, & Anderson, 2009) . Despite this controversy, most researchers agree that disgust is often elicited within the sexual-moral domain, and, thus, disgust may have a role in the condemnation of sexual transgressions (e.g., Haidt, 2003; Horberg et al., 2009; Prinz, 2007) .
Moving beyond the current literature, we propose that whether or not a person consents to, desires, or wilfully engages in a counter-normative sexual act is a critical modifier of disgust reactions within the sexual-moral domain, which has not been identified previously.
Our hypothesis that the desire of an actor matters for disgust seems on the surface to contradict past findings suggesting that disgust is more resistant to modification than anger.
However, past research comparing antecedents of anger and disgust have focused on the role of intentionality, specifically the awareness component of intentionality (see Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2011a; Young & Saxe, 2011) , while no research has focused on whether the act was performed consensually or in accordance with the recipient's desire, thus, it remains to be seen whether desire may influence disgust. Desire and awareness are both requisites for inferences of intentional action (see Malle & Knobe, 1997 ), yet one component may be present without the other; for example, a person may be aware that they have violated a sexual norm that they never wanted to perform yet they were coerced into doing so.
Likewise, a person might want to violate a bodily norm but never act upon this desire, and thus will never be aware of doing so. Therefore, in this research we isolate the desire component of intentionality and examine whether it influences levels of disgust.
Some previous theorizing might be brought to bear on this unanswered question. It has been surmised that disgust may be centered around a person's character or underlying nature, rather than the specific acts they perform, while this may be less true of anger (Haidt, 2003; Nussbaum, 2004 (Malle, 2004; Reeder, 2009; Sripada, 2010) . Connecting these 2 Although we are unaware of any empirical evidence that directly bears on this assertion, one preliminary study we conducted may be illuminating in this respect. We had 48 adult American participants imagine a young man with a deviant sexual desire (e.g., the man wanted to have sex with a dead woman's body or to have sex with his grandmother's 90-year-old female friend), but that the man never acted upon the desire. Participants rated the extent to which the man had a deviant character, and how disgusted and angry they were. We found that participants were more disgusted (M = 5.63, SD = 2.58) than angry (M = 3.13, SD = 2.46), t repeated-samples (47) = 7.49, p < .001, and that appraisals of deviant character and disgust (controlling for anger) were correlated, r(45) = .58, p < .001, while deviant character and anger (controlling for disgust) were not correlated, r(45) = .19, p = .188. The results of this preliminary study, though correlational, provide initial evidence that disgust may be more person-focused and desire-focused than is anger, at least within the domain of sexual-morality.
two perspectives suggests that a person's inner desire towards performing a sexual act may be an important antecedent of disgust.
Consistent with the preceding discussion, in the present research we tested the following hypotheses regarding the role of anger vs. disgust in the sexual-moral domain:
Hypothesis 1a: The absence of mutual consent within a counter-normative sexual act will increase transgressor-directed anger, compared to the presence of mutual consent.
Hypothesis 1b: Appraisals of injustice will be the primary appraisals of anger.
Hypothesis 1c:
Anger will strongly predict motivations to condemn (e.g., punish) the transgressor, but not motivations to condemn the consenter.
Hypothesis 2a:
The presence of consent will increase levels of disgust directed towards those who desire or consent to counter-normative sexual acts, compared to when desire or consent is absent.
Hypothesis 2b: Appraisals of abnormality and degradation will be the primary appraisals of disgust.
While we anticipated that anger would predict motivations to punish the transgressor of a sexual offense, we were less certain about the role of disgust as a predictor of condemnation. Thus, in addition to the above hypotheses, we also investigated the following research question (Question Across all four studies, we assessed appraisals of injustice and abnormality/degradation using multi-item assessments. This is necessary to test our hypotheses about the distinct appraisals of anger and disgust (Hypotheses 1b and 2b), and it is also beneficial to the field because very little research has directly measured disgustrelevant appraisals (though see Giner-Sorolla et al., 2012; Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2011a ).
Instead, most extant research on moral emotions has simply varied the nature of the eliciting stimuli (scenario) without measuring the inferences people draw from them, and the relationship these appraisals have to the elicited emotions.
Study 1
Study 1 examined the effect of anger and disgust directed at the transgressor when consent is given versus withdrawn for a counter-normative sexual act, necrophilia. Consistent with Hypothesis 1a, we predicted that participants would feel angrier at the transgressor when the sexual act was committed without the consent of the other individual; by contrast, transgressor-directed disgust should be less affected by consent. We also predicted, consistent with Hypothesis 1b, that appraisals of injustice would largely explain the effect of consent on anger directed at the transgressor, and in turn anger would predict condemnation of the transgressor (Hypothesis 1c).
Method
Participants. We recruited 73 adults (40 male, Mage = 33.53 years, SD = 14.87), located in the United States, who participated via Amazon's Mechanical Turk (www.mturk.com) in exchange for payment. The ethnicity of the sample was predominantly White (84%). We report how we determined our sample size, all data exclusions (if any), all manipulations, and all measures in the studies. We used Mechanical Turk to recruit a more diverse sample (in terms of gender, age, and education) than the 'WEIRD' samples typically obtained through university samples (see Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011) , and we used this method throughout all four of the experiments. Additionally, for all four of the experiments we aimed to recruit 30-45 participants per condition. Sample size was always determined prior to recruitment, and analysis commenced only after the target sample size was attained.
Design, materials and procedures. Before taking part in this experiment participants were provided with information about the study and gave their informed consent. Participants were informed that the experiment contained sexual themes and that they could skip any part that they were not comfortable with and withdraw from the study at any time. We used the same ethics procedure for all of the experiments.
After agreeing to take part, participants were randomly assigned to read a scenario that described an act of necrophilia, which was adapted from Parkinson, Sinnott-Armstrong, Koralus et al. (2011) . In the scenario Jack's wife requested Jack to have sex with her after she dies. In the consent version (n = 38) Jack honoured his wife's request, alternatively, in the withdrawn version (n = 35) Jack's wife told him that she no longer wanted him to have sex with her after she dies but nonetheless he goes through with the sexual act. 4 After reading the scenario, participants rated how much anger and disgust they were experiencing towards Jack, the transgressor. They were provided four words for anger (angry, mad, outraged, furious) and four words for disgust (sickened, grossed out, nauseous, queasy), rated from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (Very much). We deliberately avoided the word "disgust", as research has shown that its linguistic meaning is closer to "anger" in situations theoretically more relevant to anger (e.g., unfairness; see Nabi, 2002; . Instead, we selected linguistic elements connoting the underlying physiology of disgust, pertaining to nausea and oral inhibition -terms which have been found to help dissociate disgust from anger in the past (see Horberg et al., 2009; Nabi, 2002; Piazza et al., 2013; Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2011a , 2011b . Participants were also given a photo of an actor displaying a prototypical anger face, and a prototypical disgust face, taken from the University of California, Davis, Set of Emotion Expressions (Tracy, Robins, & Schriber, 2009 ). The five anger word/face items formed a highly reliable scale (Cronbach's α = .96); same for the five disgust items (α = .91);
thus, we separately aggregated anger and disgust indices. , all participants were then fully debriefed and were reminded of the contact details of the researchers in case they had any queries.
Analysis Plan
In each study presented here, we first conducted ANOVA tests separately for disgust and anger, which are reported in footnotes. We then followed-up significant results with ANCOVAs, controlling for covariance between the two emotions. For brevity, we report the results of the ANCOVAs in the text, as this is our primary analysis, unless the initial ANOVA was non-significant. Significant findings for disgust and anger were followed up with mediation analyses to test our appraisal and condemnation hypotheses and research question.
Results

5
Measures of political orientation were included in basic demographics for all studies on account of past research linking political conservatism and disgust sensitivity (e.g., ). We assessed political orientation either on a 1-7 or 1-9 scale with increasing scores representing greater conservatism. Analysis of political orientation was peripheral to our research aims and therefore will not be reported in detail here. In general, political orientation was unrelated to disgust levels and transgressor/consenter condemnation, across the studies, and, with one exception (Study 2), failed to interact with consent to affect either disgust or condemnation. Please contact the authors for details. A measure of disgust sensitivity was also included in Study 1 (and only Study 1) for exploratory purposes, but had little bearing on the results and therefore will not be discussed further.
The manipulation checks were found to be successful; participants were more condemning when consent was absent (see Supplementary materials). To test Hypothesis 1a
we conducted between-subjects ANCOVAs (consent vs. no consent) for both anger and disgust, controlling for the other emotion as a covariate, since anger and disgust highly correlated, r(73) = .59, p < .001. Consistent with Hypothesis 1a, the effect of consent on disgust was not significant, F < 1, p = .70, η To test Hypothesis 1b we conducted multiple mediation analyses using the PROCESS bootstrapping procedure in SPSS (see Hayes, 2013) . We entered consent as the independent variable, anger as the dependent variable, appraisals of injustice and abnormality as simultaneous mediators, and disgust as a covariate. As predicted, injustice appraisals but not abnormality appraisals significantly mediated the effect of consent on anger (see Figure 1 ).
To assess Hypothesis 1c, we then performed a mediation analysis in which anger and disgust were simultaneous mediators of the relationship between consent and moral condemnation, which revealed that anger, but not disgust, was a significant mediator (see Figure 1 ).
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
Study 2
Study 1 provided initial support for Hypotheses 1a-1c, which focused on reactions of transgressors of sexual-norm violations. We now turned the attention toward the other individual involved in the sexual act, the consenter, in order to test Hypothesis 2a, 2b and 6 When disgust was not controlled for, anger was significantly affected by consent, F(1, 71) = 11.40, p < .001, η 2 p = .14, with more anger when consent was withdrawn (M = 3.74, SE = 0.29 ) than present (M = 2.39, SE = 0.28). When anger was not controlled for, disgust was also significantly affected by consent in a similar direction, but to a lesser extent (M non-consent = 5.53, SE = 0.27 vs. M consent = 4.70, SE = 0.26), F(1, 71) = 4.97, p = .03, η 2 p = .07. Question 1. In the current experiment we examined reactions to a scenario that was less severe or controversial in nature than the previous experiment: sex with a transgender individual. We also used a different operationalization of consent in which consent is either given, or consent is withheld and yet the person is forced to participate.
Method
Participants. Eighty adults (37 female; M age = 34.57 years, SD = 13.03) located in the U.S. were recruited from the same web service as before and paid for their time. Participants from the previous study were not eligible to participate in this study. One participant was dropped from analysis because they offered the same response to every question, leaving 79 participants, who were randomly assigned to either the consent (n = 38) or non-consent condition (n = 41).
Design, materials and procedures. Participants read a vignette about a woman, Donna, who fell in love with a man who she later found out, had gender reassignment surgery. In the consent version, Donna willingly consented to have sex with the man, while in the non-consent version, Donna expressed discomfort about having sex and did not consent, but she was nevertheless forced to have sex against her will. Afterwards, participants responded to the same anger and disgust items as in Study 1, with the addition of four sympathy emotion words (sympathy, pity, empathy, compassion) , rated on a 1-9 scale (α = .85). More sympathy towards Donna was expected when consent was withheld.
Participants then filled in measures of appraisals and condemnation, on a 9-point scale. Appraisals of the injustice of Donna's actions were assessed with the previous four items; however, the reverse-scored item ("What Donna did was justified") failed to load with the other four items, thus, was dropped from the scale, improving its reliability (α = .81).
Appraisals of abnormality were assessed with the previous three items, plus two additional items focused on the durability of Donna's deviant nature ("Donna has a deviant character"; "Donna has a deviant personality"; α = .83). To assess condemnation, participants rated the same measures as in Study 1 (3 items; α = .81). We also included, as manipulation checks, one item assessing attributions of the harm Donna experienced, and two items assessing how "responsible" or "to blame" Donna was for her actions (the two items were highly correlated, r(80) = .63, p < .01). Afterwards, participants answered basic demographic questions, were debriefed and paid.
Results
The manipulation checks were once again successful, with the exception of the injustice appraisal (see Supplementary materials for manipulation checks and sympathy measures). Supporting our hypotheses, anger was equally low across consent conditions (M non-consent = 1.58, SE = 0.15; M consent = 1.27, SE = 0.15), F(1, 77) = 2.14, p = .148, η 2 p = .03.
To test Hypothesis 2a, we conducted a one-way ANCOVA on disgust scores, by consent condition, controlling for anger, since anger and disgust were moderately correlated, r(80) = .49, p < .001. We found the effect of consent on disgust towards Donna was statistically significant, with more disgust when the sexual act was consensual, F(1, 76) = 8.62, p < .005, To test Hypothesis 2b, we conducted similar multiple mediation analysis as Study 1 for the appraisal variables, which indicated that only abnormality appraisals, not injustice appraisals, mediated the effect of consent on disgust (see Figure 2) . Finally, to address Question 1, we performed a mediation analysis in which disgust was entered as a mediator, and anger as a covariate, of the effect consent had on condemnation, which revealed that disgust was a significant mediator; however, both the total and direct effects were significant, 7 An ANOVA, not controlling for anger, revealed that participants experienced marginally more disgust when Donna consented to the act than when she did not consent, F(1, 77) = 2.99, p = .088, η 2 p = .04.
suggesting that disgust did not fully account for the relationship between consent and condemnation (see Figure 2 ).
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
Study 3
In the previous experiments we found that mutual consent reduced anger directed at the transgressor (Study 1) and increased disgust directed at the consenter of a counternormative sexual act (Study 2), evincing that anger and disgust have different foci within the sexual-moral domain. The current study extends the previous studies in two ways. First, we manipulated consent within an act of violence (violence between siblings of same sex), in
addition to yet another counter-normative sexual act (sex between siblings of same sex), in order to establish whether the effects of consent on anger and disgust are specific to the sexual domain. Second, we investigated reactions to both parties involved in the event: the consenter and the transgressor, enabling us to test all of our hypotheses and research question within a single study. We also held constant that both parties were dispositionally inclined to engage in behavior of the sort described, since in the previous experiments the actors' predilections were not made explicit. Being predisposed towards a class of actions does not necessitate that a person will consent to an act when the opportunity arises. Thus, we sought to control for the predisposition of the actor, independent of whether he consented or dissented within the focal event.
Method
Participants. We recruited a new sample of 170 adults (85 male, M age = 34.46 years, SD = 12.64) located in the U.S. from the same web service as before in exchange for comparable payment.
Design, materials and procedures. The design of this study was a 2 (consent vs. no consent) x 2 (transgression: sexual vs. violence) between subjects design. Participants were randomly assigned to read one of four scenarios in which two brothers, Jeff and Thomas, engaged in sexual or violent activities with one another. The vignette was loosely inspired by R. v. Brown, a historical case in the UK in which a group of homosexual men committed voluntarily acts of masochistic violence against one another (see Baker, 2009 ). Both Jeff and
Thomas were described as having developed the urge to engage in same sex relations, or violent behavior, when they went through puberty, but because of their upbringing they felt the need to suppress these urges. However, Thomas proposes to Jeff that they should explore their urges by experimenting with one another. In the consent version, Jeff expresses to his brother that he thinks it is a good idea and consents to perform sexual or violent activities with Thomas. In the non-consent version, Jeff expresses to his brother that he thinks it is a bad idea and he is opposed to it, yet Thomas forces his brother to perform sexual or violent acts against his wishes. After reading the scenario, participants responded to a series of measures, one set pertaining to the transgressor (Thomas), and the other set pertaining to the consenter (Jeff); which set they answered first was randomized. They answered the same measures as Study 2; except we did not include the two deviant nature items or the sympathy measures. After responding to demographic questions, participants were debriefed and paid.
No other measures were collected.
Results
For our analyses we were not interested in comparing differences between actors (consenter vs. transgressor), only within; thus, we conducted analyses separately for the consenter and transgressor.
Transgressor. 8 When anger was entered as the DV and disgust was controlled for, the effect of violation type, F(1, 165) = 6.99, p = .009, η 165) = 38.81, p < .001. Hayes (2013) recommends that when you have more than one IV that you enter one IV as a predictor controlling for the other IV as a covariate, thus enabling a test of the interaction effect. Therefore, we entered consent as the predictor; violation type and anger as covariates, with injustice and abnormality appraisals as mediators, in order to examine whether the injustice appraisal could explain the interaction effect (Hypothesis 1b). , Injustice appraisals were found to mediate the effect of consent on transgressor-directed anger, across transgression type, while abnormality appraisals did not mediate transgressordirected anger (see Figure 4) . We then entered anger and disgust as simultaneous mediators of the effect of consent and moral condemnation, revealing, consistent with Hypothesis 1c, that anger but not disgust mediated the amount of condemnation toward the transgressor (see Figure 4 ).
[Insert Figure 3 
Consenter.
12 When disgust toward the consenter was entered as the dependent variable and anger was controlled for, the effect of violation type was significant, F(1, 165) = 13.14, p <.001, η 10 When entering disgust as the DV, not controlling for anger, there was a significant main effect of transgression type, F(1, 166) = 24.66, p <.001, η 2 p =.13, with more disgust directed at the transgressor for the sexual offense compared to the violent offense. There was also a significant main effect of consent, F(1, 166) = 4.04, p < .05, η 2 p = .02. However, the interaction of transgression and consent was not at all significant, F < 1, p = .91. 11 When the analysis is repeated controlling for violation type, abnormality is still a significant mediator. In a final analysis entering violation type as the predictor, neither of the appraisals could account for the difference in disgust across the different violation types. 12 Anger and disgust were correlated, r(170) = .65, p < .01. to be significant, all ps >.16; thus this analysis was not followed-up with an ANCOVA.
[Insert Figure 5 about here]
We then performed mediation analysis entering disgust toward the consenter as the outcome, appraisals as the mediators and entered anger and violation type as covariates.
Consistent with Hypothesis 2b, it was found that abnormality appraisals, but not injustice appraisals, accounted for disgust directed at the consenter as a function of consent (see Figure   6 ). We then performed a multiple mediation analysis to test whether anger and/or disgust were significant mediators of the consent-condemnation relationship controlling for violation type; this analysis indicated that the indirect effect of disgust was significant but the indirect effect of anger was not significant. Both the total and direct effects were significant, revealing that disgust did not fully account for the link between consent and consenter-directed condemnation (see Figure 6 ).
[Insert Figure 6 about here]
Study 4
Study 3 replicated the findings of Studies 1 and 2 within a single study, and revealed a domain-general relationship between anger and injustice performed by a transgressor, and a domain-specific relationship between disgust and sexual deviance exhibited by a consenting individual. Critically, mediation analyses revealed injustice as the central appraisal for anger, and abnormality/degradation as the central appraisal for disgust. It should be noted that levels of transgressor-directed disgust were not trivial for the violent act but, in contrast to transgressor-directed anger, were nonetheless below the midpoint of the scale.
In all of the previous experiments we compared a mutual consent condition to a condition in which consent was withheld and the person either went through with the action (Study 1) or was coerced into performing the act (Studies 2-3) . Thus, in the no consent conditions there was always a victim 14 , while in the consent conditions there was no victim.
As a result, we cannot determine if victimization is what supressed disgust or if it was the desire of the consenter that enhanced disgust. To rule out victimization, and isolate desire as the mechanism that enhances disgust, we devised a scenario in which the consent of the recipient of a counter-normative sexual act was held constant, while we manipulated the actor's desire towards performing the act. We also wanted to disentangle whether it is the actual performance of the act that elicits disgust, or if it is the case that one's desire toward the act is sufficient to elicit disgust.
We predicted that having the desire would be sufficient to elicit disgust, but we were uncertain whether desire would be a necessary elicitor of disgust. It might be that engaging in a sexual act is equally sufficient to elicit disgust, regardless of the actor's desire towards the act. If both desire and behavior are sufficient causes of disgust, then we should observe an interaction of desire and behavior such that desiring the counter-normative sexual act would evoke disgust regardless of whether or not the action was performed, while, conversely, engaging in the sexual act would elicit disgust regardless of the person's underlying desire; in other words, disgust should be equally high in all conditions except when the person does not desire the act and does not perform the act.
Method
Participants. We recruited a new sample of 128 adults located in the U.S.; however, 5 participants were excluded either because they did not complete the study or provided the same response for every question, leaving 123 participants (76 males, M age = 32.06, SD = 9.63).
Design, materials and procedure. The design of this study was a 2 desire (desire vs.
no desire) x 2 behavior (behavior vs. no behavior) between subjects design. Participants were randomly assigned to read one of four scenarios. The vignette was a modified version of the scenario used in Study 1; however, within all versions the wife maintained her consent.
Within the scenario we varied whether or not the husband, Jack, had the desire to engage in the sexual act. Additionally, we separately manipulated whether Jack actually engaged in the sexual act or did not have the opportunity to go through with the act. After reading the scenario, participants responded to a series of measures. They filled in the same measures of anger and disgust towards Jack as previous experiments. We also had a manipulation check of perceived desire: "To what extent do you think Jack wanted to have sex with his wife's dead body?"
They also rated their agreement with several appraisal items on 1-9 scales, which included items that measured whether Jack was seen as being cruel (4 items, α =.97), abnormal (6 items, α =.97), or having caused injustice (3 items, α =.91) (see Appendix for full list of measures). We expanded our assessment of appraisals as a more thorough test of whether it is specifically inferences about the abnormal nature of the person that is driving the disgust effects, and not inferences about other aspects of the individual's character having to do with cruelty or injustice, which are more relevant to harm and anger, respectively. We also expanded our condemnation measures, to include items pertaining to social avoidance (3 items), having a general bad character (2 items) and punishment (3 items; see Appendix). All nine measures formed a reliable index (α = .95) and were therefore aggregated to assess how much participants condemned Jack for his actions. 15 Aside from basic demographics, no other measures were collected. All participants were debriefed and paid at the end.
Results
The manipulation check, appraisals and condemnation analyses can be found in the Supplementary Materials. When disgust was entered as the dependent variable in a 2 (desire vs. no desire) 2 (behaviour vs. no behaviour) ANOVA the main effect of behavior and the predicted interaction between desire and behavior was approaching significance, but the main effect of desire was non-significant (see Table 1 and Figure 7 ). Since, disgust and anger were moderately correlated, r(123) = .62, p < .01, across conditions, we repeated the analysis controlling for anger, which revealed that both the main effect of behavior and the interaction were still marginally significant (see Table 1 and Figure 8 ). Simple effects indicated that disgust did not differ when the behavior was carried out depending on desire, F(1, 118) = 0.07, p =.79, η 2 p = .001; however, when the behavior was not carried out people felt more disgust when Jack desired to engage in the behavior than when he did not have the desire F(1, 118) = 4.41, p < .05, η 2 p = .04, and this mean was similar to the behavior-completed condition means. We then repeated the analyses using anger as the DV; however, neither of the main effects nor the interaction were found to be significant (see Table 1 and Figure 7) ; thus, this analysis was not followed up with an ANCOVA. The means were much lower for anger than disgust across all conditions.
[Insert Table 1 , Figure 7 and 8 about here]
Similar to the previous study in order to examine the interaction effect, we entered the manipulated variable that had a significant effect as the predictor whilst controlling for the other IV. We entered cruelty, abnormality, and injustice appraisals as mediators, disgust as the outcome, anger and desire manipulation as covariates, and behavior manipulation as the predictor. In line with Hypothesis 2b, it was found that the abnormality appraisals were the only significant mediator (see Figure 6 ). We then examined if disgust was a significant mediator of condemnation (Question 1), controlling for anger and the desire manipulation, entering the behavior manipulation as the predictor, which revealed that disgust was related to condemnation but it could not account for the interaction effect.
16
[Insert Figure 9 about here]
General Discussion
These four studies highlight a number of fundamental differences between anger and disgust as they pertain to sexual offenses. Consistent with our hypotheses for anger, the influence of consent on anger was focused primarily around the transgressor. In Study 1 and 3 it was found that levels of anger toward the transgressor increased when mutual consent was absent rather than present, and this relationship was uniquely mediated by injustice appraisals. Critically, because of anger's strong association with injustice, the influence of consent on anger was not limited to sexual transgressions, but violent offenses as well. This finding is important because it highlights injustice (i.e., the selfish violation of a person's interests) as the central appraisal of anger, rather than harm (i.e., inflicting pain and suffering) specifically, which has been the primary focus of most prior research. By contrast, since the consenter never caused injustice, regardless of whether consent was present or absent, anger
16 Disgust was also not a mediator of condemnation when the desire manipulation was entered as the predictor or when both anger and disgust were entered as simultaneous mediators.
towards the consenter was virtually non-existent and relatively stable. Levels of anger were also highly predictive of motivations to condemn and punish the transgressor.
On the other hand, the relationship between consent and disgust directed at the transgressor was much weaker and largely driven by anger and disgust's covariance; disgust was always higher when there was mutual consent and in general individuals were more disgusted at a transgressor of a sexual than violent act. Consistent with our hypotheses for disgust, Studies 1-3 revealed that perceiving someone as having the desire to engage in a counter-normative sexual act -whether this desire was revealed through an expression of consent or the fulfilment of a request -increased the disgust participants felt towards this consenting individual. By contrast, when the same person was perceived to be opposed to the act -either because they withheld their consent and/or were coerced into performing the act against their will -significantly less disgust was directed at this person. Furthermore, across all three studies, appraisals of abnormality and degradation, and not appraisals of injustice, mediated the effect that consent had on levels of consenter-directed disgust. Finally, while Studies 1-3 left open the possibility that the effect of consent on consenter-directed disgust was simply due to victimization, Study 4 demonstrated that desire influences disgust even in the absence of a victim. However, this study also revealed that desire, though a sufficient cause of disgust, was not a necessary cause, since when the counter-normative sexual act was carried out, levels of disgust were not affected by the presence or absence of desire. Instead, simply performing a counter-normative sexual act -independent of how the actor truly feels about it -was sufficient to elicit disgust as well. The fact that behavior alone was sufficient to elicit disgust in Study 4 may on the surface appear to contradict the findings of Studies 1-3 regarding consent and disgust. However, since we did not manipulate behavior in these earlier studies, but held behavior constant, there is no contradiction. Critically, when the counter-normative sexual behavior was not carried out, participants felt more disgust when the desire was present than when it was absent. This finding departs from past research (e.g., Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2011a; Young & Saxe, 2011) by showing that at least one element of intentionality-namely, the desire component-does affect levels of disgust.
This novel finding that disgust, but not anger, was affected by information about a person merely possessing but not acting upon sexual desire, is consistent with past theorizing that disgust is a more person-or character-focused emotion than is anger (Haidt, 2003; Nussbaum, 2004) . Yet the precise reasons for this remain unclear. We speculate that disgust is a more person-focused emotion than anger by virtue of the fact that inferences about an actor's motivations for desiring or performing a counter-normative sexual act are more focused on the inner qualities of a person (e.g., their desires and appetites), and less focused on the circumstances surrounding the event. By contrast, inferences about an actor's motives for causing injustice demand greater analysis of the surrounding circumstances, such as the recipient's attitude towards the act and whether there were mitigating factors (see Monroe, Guglielmo, & Malle, 2012; Piazza et al., 2013; Reeder, 2009) .
It is important to note that within the current research consent was non-ambiguous.
Nevertheless, in everyday occurrences the perception of consent, or of an individual's capacity to provide adequate consent, is not always so clear-cut. Research has consistently
shown that victim derogation is much more likely to occur when consent is ambiguous, or in cases where characteristics of the victim erroneously lead observers to presume a predisposition towards consent (Jones & Aronson, 1973; Kanekar & Kolsawalla, 1980; Muehlenhard, 1988; Scroggs, 1976; Whatley, 1996) . Thus, it is possible that the fairly low levels of victim-directed anger we observed in the present studies would not replicate in settings where victim consent or non-consent is harder to establish-a topic that is worthy of continued investigation.
Conclusion
The current research highlights the differential influence of consent on anger and disgust, with intriguing possibilities for future research. They suggest that anger, more so than disgust, is strongly tied to appraisals of injustice and the condemnation of transgressors of non-consensual offenses, violent and sexual, while disgust seems to be focused on the consensual nature of counter-normative sexual acts, which violate norms about the proper use of the human body. Although disgust does not seem to be a strong predictor of condemnation towards transgressors, independent of feelings of anger, disgust does sometimes predict 
